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Was Socrates an Andragogue or a Pedagogue?  Exploring the Educational Implications of 
the Philosophy for Children Movement 
Professor Terry Hyland - Faculty of Arts, Science and Education - Bolton Institute, Chadwick St, 
Bolton BL2 1JW, UK (t.hyland@bolton.ac.uk) 
Abstract 
The educational implications of  Lipman’s Philosophy for Children  (PFC) programmes are 
examined against the background of key concepts and themes: pedagogy, andragogy, curriculum 
objectives and content.  PFC strategies are closer to andragogy than pedagogy, and more open-
ended, wide-ranging and democratic than the traditional Socratic paradigm.  Such  progarmmes 
have much educational value – in teaching about virtue, work, imagination and the human 
condition in general – though the claims about fostering general, transferable reasoning and 
thinking skills are probably far too ambitious.  PFC and similar curriculum programmes are of 
inestimable benefit and value to learners of all ages, particularly in these destitute times when 




Background: Philosophy, Andragogy and Pedagogy 
              We know that a major part of philosophical reflection since Protagoras and Plato, 
                since Pythagoras, has revolved around the word training (Bildung), and thus around 
                pedagogy and reform.  The assumption is that the mind is not given to men (sic) as 
                it should be and has to be re-formed.  Childhood is the monster of  philosophers.  It's 
                also their accomplice. Childhood tells them that the mind is not given.  But that it 
                is possible (Lyotard,1992,p.115; original italics). 
 
 
Can childhood really be the 'monster of  philosophers'?  Well, clearly not of  all  philosophers and 
especially not of  Matthew Lipman - the founder of the Institute for the Advancement of 
Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State College in the USA in 1974 (IAPC,1987) - 
and his many supporters around the world (Whalley,1987; Hyland,1989; Nicol,1990). 
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    Lyotard's (characteristically and intentionally) provocative statement, however, does tend to 
highlight all the key educationally interesting issues surrounding the Philosophy for Children 
(PFC) movement which has been popularised by Lipman over the last twenty years.  Is it possible 
to teach philosophy to children in any meaningful, non-trivial sense?  What theory of 
learning/teaching and model of the mind is implied by PFC?   Is  work in this sphere education or 
training, pedagogy or andragogy and, on a more practical level, is it possible to explain and 
justify PFC against the background of the relentless 'vocationalising' of the whole curriculum 
which has characterised global educational developments over the last few decades 
(Hyland,1999; Winch,2000). 
     Lyotard certainly seems to be correct about the conception of childhood and theory of learning 
which was implied by classical philosophy.   Although the concept of liberal education is, as 
Schofield (1972) notes, rooted in the notion of freeing the mind from error - graphically 
illustrated in Plato's allegory of the Cave - teaching on this account is still authoritarian in the 
sense that it 'involves the initiation of others into worth-while activities' (Peters,1966,p.144).    
Plato has been regarded by some educators as heralding the progressive tradition in suggesting 
that 'one of the chief aims of education is to turn the soul in the right direction and save it from 
self-deceit and delusion' (Curtis & Boultwood,1970,p.12). 
    However, all this needs to be placed within the framework of a process whereby a  teacher (on 
the inside of forms of knowledge) seeks to introduce others (learners) to forms of thinking of 
which they have little or no experience.   Although, along with Scheffler (1964,p.71) - who 
describes the theory of teaching derived from Plato and St Augustine as an 'insight' model' - we 
may agree that  this does seem to involve implanting 'vision' in learners as opposed to the 
transmission of bodies of facts which is implied in Locke's  tabula rasa philosophy of mind -  the 
process is still essentially paternalistic  and authoritarian in that  learners are entirely subject to 
the control and direction of teachers.  Indeed, as Castle (1967) reminds us, the Ancient Greek 
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paidagogos was  'held in low esteem' and 'public opinion assumed that instruction went hand in 
hand with chastisement' which was 'severe and often brutal' (p.66). 
    Socrates' method of mental midwifery may also be interpreted in terms of the attempt to offer 
vision to learners but - in spite of the superficially democratic appearance of  Socratic questioning 
- the dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors is closely controlled and directed by the 
teacher (who possesses knowledge) in the interests of the student (who stands in need of such 
knowledge).  Certainly, as Castle notes, there does some to be a subtle change of emphasis from 
the Platonic conception of paideia which in the Republic and Laws meant the 'preparation of 
young people for adult life',  to the later works in which Socrates suggests that education is 'the 
search, throughout a lifetime, for knowledge of the good' (ibid.,pp.103-4).  The nature and form 
of the good are, however,  given and not open to interpretation by learners; what Nettleship 
(1969) called the 'ascent to truth' (pp.94ff) is the journey down a road designed, constructed and 
guided by teachers who are themselves in possession of a knowledge of the good. 
   Socratic method, therefore, seems to have more affinities with pedagogy than andragogy which 
is ironic given that - when the German teacher Andrew Knapp first used the term 'andragogy' in 
1833 - he was thinking mainly of Plato's educational philosophy (Nottingham Andragogy Group, 
1983).  Brookfield (1984) traces the modern history of the concept to the work of Eduard 
Lindeman in America in the 1920s, though there is little doubt that the chief  populariser of 
andragogy in contemporary adult education discourse is Malcolm Knowles (1970). Davenport 
(1987) offers a succinct account of how Knowles came to  resurrect and re-define the nature of  
the key term.  He explains that, according to Knowles, pedagogy: 
             is derived  from the Greek words paid (meaning 'child') and agogos (meaning  
              'leader of'); consequently pedagogy literally means 'the art and science of teaching 
              children.  Knowles then makes a curious semantical leap when he defines andragogy. 
              Aner (meaning 'man' or 'adult') and agogos (meaning 'leader of') would seemingly 
              be translated as 'the art and science of teaching men or adults'.  However, Knowles 
              apparently wants to emphasize the differences between the education of children 
              and adults so he interprets andragogy as 'the art and science of helping adults  
              learn' (p.110). 
 
 4 
    Thus, on this account, andragogy  - in stressing the primacy of learning over teaching, and 
moving from didacticism to facilitation in the educational process - is clearly aligned with the 
progressive, student-centred tradition in educational theory pioneered by Rousseau, Herbart and 
Dewey (Entwistle,1970).  Moreover, in expanding this tradition to incorporate activities 
specifically designed for adult students, andragogical theory foregrounds the importance of 
building on the life experience of learners and - as expounded in Dewey's pragmatic philosophy 
(Dewey,1963) -  orienting learning towards problems and topics rather than the nature of 
particular disciplines.  Like Dewey, Lipman (1988) is concerned ultimately with radical 
educational reform - with a 'thoroughgoing reappraisal of education' (p.17) - and he thinks that 
introducing philosophy into the schools is a way of bringing about such reform.   
Philosophy for Children: An Overview 
        The Lipman programme is founded on the notion that - if we strip the 'formidable 
terminology' from traditional philosophy - then what remains is a: 
                         wealth of ideas (which can be rephrased in children's own words) and the 
                         discipline of logic.  Present the philosophy in the form of children's novels, 
                         and encourage classroom discussions of the ideas. Now what happens?      
                                                                                                                     (IAPC,1987,p.4)   
 
The answer which PFC proponents give is that philosophy becomes a genuine elementary school 
subject  incorporating a vast range of educational benefits including - apart from the intrinsic 
value of introducing youngsters to important philosophical ideas and concepts - such extrinsic 
advantages as improving thinking and discussion skills, enhancing moral development and 
fostering general reflection and intellectual development. 
    Through specially designed narratives - described as 'philosophical novels' (Murris,1994,p.80) 
- the key idea of the programme is to get children 'thinking aloud with others' 
(Morehouse,1993,p.10).  Existing children's literature was thought unsuitable by Lipman and his 
co-workers since this tended to 'pre-empt the child's imagination (1980,p.35). PFC materials use 
stories appropriate to the ability and level of students (e.g. 'Pixie' for junior, 'Harry Stottlemeier' 
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for middle school, and 'Suki' for secondary pupils; IAPC,1987,pp.8-11), and which are all 'about 
school children and the experiences they have' (Nicol,1990,p.179). Each set of materials is 
accompanied by teachers' manuals which recommend organisational procedures and triggers for 
philosophical discussion. 
   The programme is underpinned by an assumption about children's curiosity and their innate 
impulse to ask 'philosophical' questions such as 'What is time?' and 'What's a mind?' 
(Whalley,1987,p.264), and the belief that - since these are often dismissed by parents, teachers 
and elders - the philosophically creative impulse is often stifled at an early age.  The teacher's role 
is said to be that of facilitator who responds to the children's reactions to and discussions about 
the questions and issues raised in the PFC stories. As Nicol (1990) puts it: 
           The students must be made to feel intellectually safe and given a sense of their 
             own right to contribute to the learning process in which they are taking part. The 
             teacher must then exercise personal and interpersonal skills in ensuring such an 
             environment exists and that no individual is excluded because they feel inadequate 
             to meet the demands of the lesson (p.180). 
            
It could be claimed that such a learning environment is an ideal  prerequisite of any sort of 
meaningful learning.  However, in the Lipman programme the process - stimulating discussion 
and fostering a community of enquiry - becomes an end in itself which complements the other  
ends of enhancing systematic thinking skills and fostering philosophical interests. 
   In addition to the intrinsic ends of introducing students to the world of philosophy, a number of 
important extrinsic general educational goals are claimed to be achieved through the programme. 
Large-scale experiments conducted by the Educational Testing Service in Newark, N.J. reported 
significant gains in mathematics and reasoning for children who had followed a PFC programme 
as against those not exposed, in addition to gains in reading level by such pupils (IAPC,1987,p.4).  
Whalley (1987,p.279) summarises the case for introducing the Lipman approach into UK 
education as follows: 
• It would allow pupils to learn reasoning in its natural home - dialogue and enquiry 
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• It would give children the opportunity to discuss important issues not covered in the 
mainstream curriculum 
• It would foster in youngsters the idea that there are serious problems and issues which are 
not susceptible to pat or glib resolution 
• It would give children an idea of what can be achieved through the collaboration of minds 
and co-operative enquiry 
• It would give pupils confidence in their ability to think for themselves 
• It would provide an antidote to the fragmentation of the curriculum by dealing with issues 
that are fundamental to learning of all kinds and providing - what Young (1999) calls the 
'connectivity' between forms of knowledge and learning - which is essential to the 
progresssion and continuity of learning throughout life 
 
Can Children Do Philosophy? 
    A common objection to the PFC and similar programmes is that, as Whalley (1987,p.261) put 
it, 'philosophy is much too difficult for children', particularly in the early years.  This invites the 
obvious response that - if philosophy is presented in the way it is generally pursued in higher 
education - then, obviously, mathematics, history, science and many other subjects are also much 
too difficult for children.  Indeed, it is the esoteric nature of philosophy which - particularly in 
Britain where it was restricted to universities until school curricula were introduced in the 1980s 
(Butler, 1984) - has produced a distorted view of the subject as being a difficult, high-level study 
suited only for the initiated few.  Paradoxically, it is this same slightly arcane and mysterious 
conception which has helped to sustain the widespread popularity of philosophy as a (non-
vocational, non-examination) subject offered in adult education centres for the last fifty years or 
so (Hyland, 1984). 
    In response to the objection that PFC is not 'proper' philosophy since it is not based on a 
thorough knowledge of  great philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Russell, Whalley replies that 
- on this restricted 'ivory tower' account - Socrates and his interlocutors could not have been 
doing real philosophy either since 'they, too, did not have the good fortune to be acquainted with 
these illustrious names' (1987,p.262).  A related concern is that, for young children unable to 
distinguish between nuances of knowledge and belief, there is a danger that they may be 
indoctrinated into certain belief systems.   Apart from the fact that 'indoctrination' of this kind is 
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overtly present in many curriculum subjects (especially connected with religion; cf. Hirst,1974), 
it is worth pointing out that philosophising in general - and the Lipman project in particular- is 
based on a non-directive, facilitating rather than a didactic role for the teacher.  As Murris (1994) 
has observed, the 'community of enquiry' strategy which is central to the PFC project: 
               assumes a meeting of minds, where pupils aided by a facilitator, among other 
                 things: clarify and justify their beliefs, make connections, generalize, give 
                 examples and counter-examples, look for assumptions and speculate (p.80). 
 
The teaching role implied here - similar to that of the neutral teacher in the Humanities 
Curriculum Project popularised in Britain in the 1970s (Schools Council,1970) - is designed 
precisely to counter indoctrination and promote open-ended enquiry.  
    Moreover, mainstream educational theory - from the progressive child-centred tradition to 
contemporary lifelong learning discourse - seems to lend support to the claims made for PFC.   
The curriculum theorist, Jerome Bruner (1974), is perhaps the most powerful advocate of opening 
up the school curriculum to the complete range of a society's culture, traditions and collective 
values and experience.  In a famous passage he argues that: 
              for any knowledge and empowering skill that exists in the culture there is a 
                corresponding form that is within the grasp of the young learner at the stage 
                of development where one finds him (sic) - that any subject can be taught to 
                anybody at any age in some form that is both interesting and honest.  Once 
                mastered in that appropriate form, the learner can go on to more powerful, 
                more precise forms of knowing and of using knowledge (p.32). 
 
 
This model of development provides the foundation for the so-called 'spiral curriculum' 
(Bruner,1966) whereby basic concepts and elements of all the disciplines are introduced in the 
early years of schooling then re-visited and explored in greater depth at later stages.  On this 
account, philosophy deserves its place in the curriculum as much as any of the other 'forms of 
knowledge' that have evolved over the years (Hirst,1965).  Moreover, as Nicol's (1990) research 
on the introduction of the Lipman programme in an English comprehensive school demonstrated, 
younger pupils tend to get much more from the philosophical novels than older ones. 
Philosophy and Thinking Skills 
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    In addition to the epistemological justification for including philosophy in school curricula, the 
PFC movement has from the outset drawn also on the 'thinking skills' developments of recent 
years.  Philosophical initiatives were introduced into the secondary school curriculum in Britain 
through the creation of  A-level courses and also under the banner of  'thinking skills' and 
'problem-solving'  programmes (Fisher,1987).  At primary school level, there were similar trends 
which were justified in terms of  fostering 'transferable skills' conducive to 'flexible thinking for a 
technological age' (Greenberg,1987,p.18).  Although, philosophy never did become firmly 
established as a curriculum subject - due largely due to the introduction of a prescriptive national 
curriculum at secondary level in 1988 and the vocationalisation of  post-school provision 
throughout the 1990s (Hyland,1994) - the transferable skills agenda is now a permanent feature of 
educational discourse in Britain. 
    Key skills - covering areas such as communication, problem-solving and working with others 
(Hyland,1999) - are now mandatory features of practice at school and post-school level, and 
justified as a means of providing for the general transfer of learning which the official curriculum 
does not supply. As already mentioned the PFC programme makes much of the power of  
philosophy to stimulate so-called thinking skills.  The IAPC (1987) literature informs us that: 
                   Philosophy is an exceptional thinking skills program because of a number of 
                     unusual features.  First, it gives children a fresh look at the logic already embedded 
                     in the language they use in everyday life.  Second, it provides a wealth of exercises 
                     and activities based upon those philosophical concepts which children love to talk 
                     about, such as friendship, fairness, reality, truth, being a person, and goodness. 
                     Third, the program is based on the assumption that discussion skills are the 
                     foundation of thinking  skills (p.4). 
 
Moreover, the reasoning and thinking skills fostered through the use of  IAPC materials are, it is 
claimed, the 'foundation of learning' (Nicol,1990,p.180). 
     Although a number of the claims about the educational value of PFC are unexceptionable, the 
conjunction of these with the rise in recent years of 'skill-talk' (Barrow, 1987) at all levels of 
educational provision needs to be treated with caution.  The vocationalisation of the curriculum at 
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all levels in recent years has been paralleled  by a re-interpretation of the aims and purposes of 
education in terms of skills of various kinds.  However, when faced with lists of so-called 'skills' 
which include communication, problem-solving and fault-finding alongside life skills, reasoning 
skills and survival skills (Hyland & Johnson,1998), we are bound to ask whether the same 
concept of skill is being used in all cases and, indeed, whether the concept has not now become 
entirely vacuous as a result of being stretched beyond its semantic limits. 
    A common error in this sphere involves making the invalid move from identifying features 
common to different skills (e.g. thinking or reasoning) and, from this, inferring the existence of a 
common skill.  As Dearden (1984) observes in this respect: 
           ...there may indeed be features common to all skilled performances in virtue of 
           which we call them skilled, but it does not follow that it is the same skill which 
           is present in each case: in the skater, the juggler, the flautist, the chess player 
           and the linguist (p.78; original italics). 
 
In a similar vein, Barrow (1987) regrets the indiscriminate use of skill in that it serves to 'blur the 
differences' between 'physical, intellectual, perceptual, social, creative and interpersonal 
operations'(p.188). 
    In addition to the nebulosity of such skill-talk, there is also the danger of overestimating the 
degree to which so-called key skills are transferable independently of context.  In much of the 
educational literature in this sphere there is an assumption that - once people have learned to 
solve problems, find faults or write reports, for example - then these skills can be transferred to 
all other contexts regardless of subject matter or field.    However, apart from the fact that there is 
little or no empirical evidence to support such notions - with most studies indicating that the 
development of expertise cannot be separated from context (Halsall & Cockett,1996) - the 
conception of  generally transferable capabilities of any kind seems to be counter-intuitive. 
    Take problem-solving, for instance.  How can solving problems in electrical engineering be 
remotely connected with solving problems in business studies, meteorology, chess, poetry or 
philosophy.  All such allegedly generalisable skills need to be grounded in fields of specialist 
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knowledge and experience, and situated within 'communities of practice' (Wenger,2002) which 
are required to make sense of any form of recognisably human activity.  So-called thinking skills 
are no exception to these conditions.  How many kinds of thinking are there?  Arguably, at least 
as many as many as there are forms and fields of knowledge and perhaps - as Wittgenstein (1974) 
hints at in Philosophical Investigations - as many as would be needed to service a 'multiplicity of  
language-games' (p.11). 
      Thus, although it is possible to make some sense of 'thinking' , 'discussion' and even 
'philosophical' skills, perhaps it would be prudent not to make too many exaggerated or over-
ambitious claims about these in the context of philosophy for children programmes.  The pursuit 
of truth, after all, tends to be an irreducibly 'domain-specific activity' (Gardner & 
Johnson,1996,p.454).  Ultimately, it might be enough to settle for stimulating discussion about 
topics of central intrinsic human interest and contributing to the fostering of a love of philosophy 
in young people.   
Conclusion - Philosophy, Children and the Aims of Education 
    In seeking an answer to the crucial question concerning 'what are the ingredients of the good 
life in pursuit of which we undertake to educate people?', Mary Warnock (1977,p.129) constructs 
a possible answer under the three key headings of 'Virtue, Work and Imagination'.  This is an 
interesting and creative way of investigating the aims of education, and a welcome antidote to the 
current pre-occupations with economistic and vocational objectives. 
Virtue 
     In answering the famous Socratic question - 'Can virtue be taught?' - in the affirmative, 
Warnock enters the caveat that 'morality, or virtuousness, should be taught, and can be learned, 
but not in special lessons' (ibid.,p143).   There is a determination here to find a middle way 
between the 'values clarification' method of moral education - with the teacher adopting a 'neutral' 
(Hyland,1986) stance in relation to rival versions of goodness - and the idea that teachers can, by 
example and instruction, somehow make children moral. Although virtue morality has recently 
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gained ascendancy both in philosophy of education and moral education (Haydon,1999) its 
expression in Aristotle has been tempered by recent theorising.  Thus, it is no longer enough to 
follow the Aristotelian precept of learning to be good by performing good acts  - entering the 
'palace of reason...by the courtyard of habit' as Peters (1966,p.314) put it - because example and 
practice do not take sufficient account of the cognitive-developmental aspects of moral learning 
identified by Piaget, Kohlberg and others (Duska & Whelan,1977). 
    Kohlberg's theoretical and philosophical work on the moral development of children stretching 
over three decades (Kohlberg,1973) resulted in a well-defined series of stages which people 
passed through in moving from moral ignorance  to maturity.  There are six principal stages - 
from pre-conventional, heteronomous morality, through conventional, conformist, to post-
conventional, principled and universal morality (Hersh, Miller & Fielding, 1980,pp.124-126) - 
and an insistence by Kohlberg that moral progress consists in moving from lower to higher 
stages, since the 'highest stages [universal ethical principles] are most able to handle moral 
complexity in a stable and consistent way' (ibid.,p.123). 
     The teacher helps students to move from one stage to the next by presenting them with 
problems and dilemmas which challenge the key features of the current stage of moral 
development and - through analysis and reflection - prompt pupils to move on to the next level. A 
famous example used in most texts in this field is Heinz's Dilemma - telling of a man who stole 
an expensive drug to save his wife's life after the druggist refused to sell him the medicine at a 
price he could afford (ibid.,pp.122ff) - which challenges pupils at the pre-conventional and 
conventional stages to weigh and balance different conceptions of honesty, loyalty, property 
rights and the value of human life.  In a similar way the Lipman strategy (clearly influenced by 
Kohlberg's ideas) uses provocative stories  designed to stimulate children's thinking about 
'friendship, fairness, truth, reality and moral goodness'(Nicol,1990,p.180). Ethical enquiry, for 
Lipman (1987), becomes an 'ethical craft' and the students are 'apprentices in that craft' (p.139). 
Work 
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    In place of the crude utilitarian and instrumentalist conception of vocational studies which 
currently characterises educational policy, it is refreshing to come across Warnock's approach to 
the topic.  Jarrett (1991) has argued that perhaps the 'single most important goal for a teacher to 
work towards has to do with the basic attitude towards work' (p.206), and similar sentiments 
inspire Warnock's  conception that 'work is and always must be an ingredient of the good life' 
such that a 'life without work would always be less good than a life which contained it' 
(1977,p.144). By taking the concept of work seriously - exploring its ethical, political and 
aesthetic aspects - vocational studies can be accorded the value it deserves (and was given in 
Dewey's philosophy) and preparation for working life can be rescued from its contemporary 
utilitarian malaise. 
    Philosophical analysis has much to offer in this upgrading of vocationalism (Hyland,1998). 
Marking differences between concepts such as 'work' and 'play', 'work', 'labour' and 'toil' - in 
addition, to an appreciation of the main features of 'autonomous' and 'heteronomous' work 
(White,1997) - can, for instance, contribute much to an understanding of  contemporary 
perspectives, attitudes and values in relation to work.   Similarly, there is clearly much counter-
indoctrinatory activity to be undertaken in acquainting pupils with alternatives to the current 
standard view about so-called 'post-Fordist' economics and the need to direct education towards 
employability skills to equip individuals to compete in the global market.  An examination of the 
social value of work,  of the aesthetic ideals enshrined in  pursuing crafts and artisanship, and of 
the moral principles which underpin working life could provide a valuable antidote to the present 
impoverished conceptions which currently hold sway.  Current moves to stress civic values and 
citizenship in the UK curriculum for schools (Crick,1998) could learn much from the PFC 




    For Warnock (1977) imagination covers 'a human capacity shared by everyone who can 
perceive and think, who can notice things and can experience emotions'.  It is that 'image-making 
capacity...by means of which we characterize and feel things to be familiar, unfamiliar, beautiful, 
desirable, strange, horrible, and so on' (pp.131-132).  This aspect of educational development is 
clearly of the first importance yet - outside the remit of specialist art or literature courses - it 
receives little attention at either school or post-school levels.  Indeed, even in specialist courses 
imagination and creativity are often stifled in the pursuit of objectified learning outcomes and 
qualifications.  Philosophy is, arguably, a prime vehicle and architectonic focus for stimulating 
human imagination in all its forms. 
    Although the PFC programme offers considerable scope for fostering the imaginative faculties 
in children, its insistence on bespoke materials (linked to specifically accredited teachers, 'trained' 
in the use of these) could pose a threat to the development of genuine autonomy and creativity in 
youngsters.  Moreover, as Murris (1994) demonstrates, the arguments of the PFC authors against 
the use of existing children's literature rest on mistaken assumptions.  She claims that the Lipman 
approach is ambiguous about the literal, symbolic and philosophical messages contained in 
narratives and, consequently, does not sufficiently allow for the important constructivist activity 
children engage in when interpreting images of all kinds.   This also leads to a curious 
parochialism in the use of materials which overlooks the importance of  utilising a wide range of 
media - advertising, television, drama, cartoons, documentaries and film -  to explicate 
philosophical issues. 
    It is true that much existing literature - including some recent popular philosophical writing 
allegedly written for children such as Gaarder's Sophie's World (1997) - seems to be about 
children rather than for them.  Simply including children in philosophy books does not 
necessarily result in philosophy suitable for children, and it would be a mistake to artificially 
restrict the range of narrative and visual material available for teaching philosophy.  So-called 
'philosophical novels' come in many guises, including ones which ostensibly have nothing much 
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to do with philosophy. Even though Iris Murdoch claimed to be 'opposed in principle to the 
enterprise of writing philosophic novels' (Herman,2001,p.551) she actually produced some of the 
finest examples of the form - particularly The Bell and Flight from the Enchanter written in the 
1950s (Levenson, 2001) - published in the last century.  If  it could be interpreted in ways 
understandable to the young, such imaginative writing would enrich any philosophy for children 
programme, 
Coda  
    Socrates was a pedagogue rather than an andragogue.  Lipman (1988) is only too aware of this 
in noting that commentaries on Plato's Gorgias - in which  Callicles insinuates that philosophy is 
for children only and not serious enough for grown-ups - seek to refute Callicles by showing that 
'philosophy is for adults only, and the older, presumably, the better' (p.3).  Thus, although Lipman 
does indeed demonstrate that philosophy can be done with children of all ages, it has to be said 
that his methodology, underpinning educational rationale and community of enquiry approaches 
to teaching philosophy are  more open-ended, democratic and wide-ranging than the Socratic 
programme.  Indeed, Socrates would probably not be able to grasp fully Lipman's approach to 
teaching ethical enquiry informed by the notion of steering between  'authoritarian indoctrination 
and mindless relativism' (ibid.,p.82). Neither indoctrination nor relativism is allowed for in 
theories which hold that goodness is a form of objective and demonstrable knowledge.   
    Schools and colleges have much to gain from the Lipman programme provided that both its 
objectives and learning materials are interpreted and utilised flexibly, allowing for modification 
to suit different purposes and contexts.  In this respect, a recent conference  sponsored by the 
International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children - examining themes of 'citizenship, 
thinking and philosophy for children' (Winstanley, 2001) - was both positive and optimistic.  Not 
only is the programme still very much alive but - as the 160 delegates from 26 countries 
demonstrated - it is being creatively and enthusiastically adopted by increasing numbers of 
educators for  a multiplicity of purposes.  The  large claims about fostering general, transferable 
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and thinking skills and promoting reasoning which underpins all forms of learning are probably 
far too ambitious.  However, even if we have to temper these with curriculum common-sense, 
there is still much of value in the PFC programme which can be of inestimable benefit to students 
of all ages, particularly in this destitute time when education has become synonymous with skills 
training and preparation for employment.  Philosophy is the ideal antidote to the present 
curriculum impoverishment and instrumentalism and far too important to be omitted from the 
upbringing and education of any child. 
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